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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This dispute arises out of an alleged employment agreement between plaintiff 
Robert Gray and defendants Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way"), a Washington 
corporation, and Ray Allard, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson, individuals who collectively 
own the controlling shares of stock in Tri-Way. In early 2004, the parties held a number of 
discussions concerning various proposed business ventures, and eventually came together on 
May 21,2004, to discuss a "Draft Employment Agreement" that had been prepared by Mr. Gray. 
This Draft Agreement set forth a number of proposed terms, including provisions for the term of 
Mr. Gray's proposed employment and the compensation he might receive. The parties were 
unable to reach a final agreement with respect to the Draft Employnent Agreement at the 
May 21 meeting, at which time it was understood by all that Mr. Peterson would revise the Draft 
Employmeilt Agreement for further review. Consequently, a number of drafts and other 
correspondence were exchanged between the parties as they attempted to reach a final agreement 
on the terms of Mr. Gray's employment. Ultimately, the parties were unable to agree on the 
material terms and, in October 2004, Mr. Gray broke off hrther negotiations and resigned from 
his employment with Tri-Way. 
Following his resignation, Mr. Gray filed suit against Tri-Way, alleging breach of 
contract, a claim for statutory wages, promissory and equitable estoppel, and fraud. The 
complaint was subsequently amended to include Mr. Allard, as well as Mr. and Mrs. Peterson as 
individual defendants. Following discovery defendants moved for summary judgment, and after 
the matter had been fully briefed and argued, the court granted summary judgment in favor of 
defendants on the basis that there had never been a meeting of the minds on the contract terms 
alleged by plaintiff, and that plaintiff had not reasonably relied upon any alleged 
misrepresentations concerning the terms of his employment. This appeal followed. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On December 2,2004, plaintiff filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
against Tri-Way, setting forth claims under theories of breach of contract, a claim for statutory 
wages, promissory and equitable estoppel, and fraud. (R. at 8-17.) Defendant Tri-Way filed its 
answer thereto on July 13,2005. (R. at 18-23.) After conducting initial discovery, plaintiff filed 
his First Amended Conlplaint and Demand for Jury Trial on February 10,2006. (R. at 24-38.) 
The Amended Complaint added Ray Allard, Kathy Peterson, and Gary Peterson as individual 
defendants and expanded the scope of the equitable relief sought to include additional claims for 
quasi-contract, constructive fraud and quasi-estoppel. Defendants filed their Answer to the 
Amended Complaint on March 13,2006, and included a counterclaim asserting several legal and 
equitable claims against plaintiff. (R. at 39-51.) 
Additional discovery was conducted in f h e r a n c e  of the Amended Complaint, 
and on August 2,2006, defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal 
of all claims raised in the Amended Complaint. (R. at 52-54.) The following day, plaintiff filed 
his own Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of defendants' counterclaims, but not 
otherwise seeking judgment with respect to any of the claims raised in his Arnended Complaint. 
(R. at 55-57.) Briefing and affidavits were submitted by both parties in support of their motions 
(see R., Exs. 1-12) and a hearing was held on September 25,2006. (R. at 65-67.) During the 
hearing, the court raised the issue of whether the statute of frauds would apply to the alleged oral 
contract at issue, and plaintiffs counsel requested an opportunity to brief that issue. (R. at 66.) 
Defense counsel stipulated to supplemental briefing, limited solely to the issue of whether the 
statute of frauds applied, and a stipulated briefing schedule was executed by counsel. (R. at 66, 
68-68A.) A supplemental memorandum was submitted by defendants on October 13, 2006, and 
plaintiffs supplemental response was filed on November 13,2006. (R. at Exs. 13, 14.) A reply 
memorandum was filed by defendants on November 27,2006. (R. at 69-80.) Oral argument on 
the supplemental briefing was waived by the parties. 
Following summary judgment proceedings, plaintiff made an oral motion that the 
parties be ordered into mediation, which was unopposed by defendants. When mediation failed, 
the parties notified the district court that the motions for summary judgment were ripe for final 
decision. Accordingly, the district court entered its Order Granting Motion for Summary 
Judgment to Tri-Way on June 5,2007. (R. at 81-98.) On June 14,2007, the court entered an 
Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 99- 
101.) Because defendants had waived argument on three of their six counterclaims, plaintiffs 
motion was granted in part as to those counterclaims, and they were dismissed. However, the 
court denied plaintiffs motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaims for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contract, and conversion, 
finding that there existed genuine issues of material fact on those issues that precluded summary 
judgment. (R. at 100.) 
The district court's Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to Tri-Way 
did not deny any portion of defendants' motion, which had sought dismissal of all claims brought 
under the Amended Complaint. (R. at 97.) However, because the order appeared to address only 
the breach of contract, statutory wage and statute of frauds issues (and was silent with respect to 
the claims for quasi-contract, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, fraud, constructive fraud 
and quasi-estoppel claims), plaintiff filed a Motion for Clarification of Granting Motion for 
Summary Judgment to Tri-Way on July 3,2007. (R. at 102-104.) Following this motion, the 
district court entered an Order Clarifying June 5,2007 Suminary Judgment Order and Correcting 
the Order on August 7,2007. (R. at 105-1 19.) The August 7 Order made it clear that summary 
judgment was granted on all of plaintiffs claims. 
Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on September 1 I, 2007. (R. at 125- 
28.) In accordance with Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants timely filed their 
application for costs, including a Motion for Attorney's Fees. (R. at 129-141.) A Notice of 
Appeal of that judgment was filed by plaintiff on October 15, 2007. (R. at 142-144.) On 
December 21,2007, the district court issued its Order Granting Costs and Attorney Fees, 
awarding defendants their costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(C), as well as a reasonable attorney 
fee award, and denying defendants their claimed discretionay costs under Rule 54(d)(l)(D). (R. 
at 167-174.) A Notice of Appeal was subsequently filed on January 18,2008, appealing the 
award of costs and attorney fees. (R. at 175-178.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Robert Gray's search for employment outside Albertsons. 
Prior to his efforts to join Tri-Way, plaintiff was working as a senior construction 
manager for Albertson's kc .  See Deposition Transcript of Robert Gray (hereinafter, "Gray 
Depo."), pp. 42-44, attached as Ex. A, Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Murray Aff.") (R. at Ex. 2.) Beginning in 2001, and 
continuing thereafter, Albertson's began to downsize its construction operation in plaintiff's 
northwest region. See id., p. 45. By 2002, Albertson's had laid off at least half of its 
construction managers andlor supervisors in the northwest. See id., p. 50. Accordingly, in 
November 2003, plaintiff held discussions with both Rite Aid, and with AC Electric, an 
electrical contractor in Washington state with whom plaintiff had worked in his capacity as 
construction manager for Albertson's and who was apparently interested in opening an office in 
Phoenix, Arizona. See id., pp. 53-54. When nothing came of these discussions, Mr. Gray began 
similar discussions with Tri-Way. Although plaintiff claims that he did not make his decision to 
leave Albertson's until April of 2004 (see id., p. 53), he has also testified that his first contact 
with Tri-Way regarding prospective employment occurred as early as January 2004. See id., 
p. 61. Furthermore, plaintiff has testified to "several other discussions [with Tri-Way] in January 
and then into February," which culminated in a face-to-face meeting between plaintiff and 
defendants Gary Peterson and Ray Allard in the Tri-Cities in late February 2004. See id,, p. 68. 
During that meeting in the Tri-Cities, several options were discussed, although no resolution was 
achieved, yet the parties seemed intent on capturing construction work for Safeway and 
Albertson's in the Phoenix area. See id., p. 73. According to plaintiff, the Tri-Cities meeting 
ended with plaintiff "volunteering to contact an attomey and CPA in Boise to try and 
memorialize what had been discussed," including not only a potential employment relationship, 
but also an apparent proposal whereby plaintiff would buy out Gary Peterson's interest in 
Tri-Way at a future date. See id., p. 75; see also Gray Depo. Ex. 2. 
2. The terms set forth in plaintiff's Draft Employment Agreement were 
expressly rejected by defendants. 
A few weeks later, plaintiff forwarded a proposal to Gary Peterson and Ray 
Allard dated March 16,2004. See Gray Depo. Ex. 3; see also Gray Depo., pp. 155-158. Despite 
plaintiffs efforts to put forth a detailed proposal, he has testified that as of March 16, 2004, there 
was no agreement between the parties as to any material terms. See Gray Depo., p. 158. On or 
about April 29,2004, plaintiff sent an e-mail to his accountant, Rob Grover, referencing 
partnership papers that he was having his attomey draft for a "corporationlpartnership in 
Arizona." See Gray Depo. Ex. 5. Shortly thereafter, a "Draft Employment Agreement" prepared 
by plaintiffs attorney, at plaintiffs direction, was completed and circulated to Gary Peterson for 
his review. See Gray Depo., p. 177; Gray Depo. Ex. 6. While plaintiff is unclear as to what day 
he may have sent the Draft Employment Agreement to Mr. Peterson, he testified that the 
proposed contract was brought to a meeting with Mr. Peterson and Mr. Allard on May 21,2004. 
See Gray Depo., p. 179. Gary Peterson acknowledged receiving the Draft Employment 
Agreement for the first time from plaintiff on May 19,2004. See Deposition Transcript of Gary 
Peterson ("Peterson Depo."), pp. 197-199, and Peterson Depo. Ex. 8, attached as Ex. B, Murray 
Aff. (R. at Ex. 2.) 
Plaintiff's Draft Employment Agreement proposed that, beginning on June 1, 
2004, Mr. Gray would be paid an initial base salary of $4,000 per month, which would be raised 
to $10,000 per month beginning in the calendar year 2005. See Gray Depo., p. 179; see also 
Gray Depo. Ex. 6. The Draft Employment Agreement also sought "an annual bonus of 
50 percent (50%) of the net profit, before taxes, of the employer, such net profit to be calculated 
only for the Arizona division of the employer." See id. Mr. Peterson expressly noted his 
rejection of the Draft Employment Agreementeon the face thereof, and communicated that 
rejection to Mr. Gray. See Peterson Depo., p. 199, LL. 5-15. Mr. Gray also testified that he 
understood changes were being made to his proposed tenns. See Gray Depo., p. 216, LL. 15-21. 
As negotiations over the Draft Employment Agreement progressed, one of the 
primary points of contention became the manner in which plaintiff would be compensated, 
particularly the proposed bonus provisions. See Gray Depo., pp. 216-217,235,240,244; 
Peterson Depo., pp. 120-121, 132-135, 140-145, 147-148; Deposition Transcript of Ray Allard 
("Allard Depo."), pp. 79, 130-13 1, 154-155, attached as Ex. C., Murray Aff. (R. at Ex. 2.) 
On or about June 4,2004, a revised "Draft Employment Agreement" was 
prepared by Tri-Way's attorney. See Peterson Depo., pp. 213-214. After reviewing this 
document Mr. Peterson again noted that the terms were rejected, and indicated on the face 
thereof the need for further changes. See Gray Depo. Ex. 8; see also Peterson Depo., p. 217. 
Even though no final agreement had yet been reached and negotiations over the Draft 
Employment Agreement continued, Mr. Gray began working for Tri-Way on June 1,2004. 
3. The parties'continuing negotiations never resulted in an agreemeut 
with respect to material terms of the proposed employment 
agreement. 
A revised "Draft Employment Agreement" bearing the date June 4,2004, was 
prepared by Tri-Way's attorney and provided to defendants. Peterson Depo. Ex. 10. That 
revision contained several internal questions, set forth in italics, particularly with respect to the 
incentive or bonus pay provisions set forth at Section 4.3, Article 4, of the Drafl Employment 
Agreement. See id., p. 2. Given the methods of calculating such pay as set forth in Mr. Gray's 
May 21 "Draft," and the confusion generated thereby, Gary Peterson once again expressly 
indicated that tl~ose temts were rejected, and that the Draft Employment Agreement needed 
further changes. See id., p. 1. Later revisions to the compensation provisions, including 
defendants' proposed means of calculating "Performance Based Salary" and "Incentive or Bonus 
Pay" were provided to Mr. Gray (see Gray Depo. Ex. 16), which he rejected. Gray Depo., 
p. 240. 
Even though the parties were continually trying to negotiate mutually agreeable 
terms regarding the incentive or bonus pay, there was never any dispute that Mr. Gray was to 
receive an initial salary of $4,000 per month (see Gray Depo., p. 93), that Mr. Gray's salary 
would have doubled on December 1,2004, to $8,000 per month (see Peterson Depo., p. 183), 
and that once the method of bonus calculations could be finally negotiated, Mr. Gray would 
receive a bonus as well (see Peterson Depo., p. 133). Unfortunately, the parties were never able 
to fully and finally agree on the form of the bonus payment, or the means whereby that bonus 
would be calculated and distributed. See Peterson Depo., pp. 138, 140, 141, 144-145, and 148. 
Furthermore, the parties believed that a final agreement would be reached and reduced to a 
writing. See Appellant's Brief 16; Peterson Depo., pp. 151, 152,266; Allard Depo., p. 152. 
Following Mr. Gray's rejection of the proposed employment terms, he made one 
"last ditch" effort to buy out Gary Peterson and create a partnership with Ray Allard. See Gray 
Depo., pp. 253-254. Although Mr. Petersoil was given a deadline of October 25,2004, by which 
to respond to this final offer, at some point prior to October 20, plaintiff returned all of the 
corporate credit cards to Mr. Peterson at the Vancouver office and, on October 21,2004, 
Mr. Gray tendered his resignation from Tri-Way. See Gray Depo., Exs. 22, 22A. Plaintiff also 
acknowledged that there was no agreed-upon formula for the computation of his bonus in a 
subsequent e-mail dated October 26,2004, when he stated that it was up to Gary Peterson and 
Ray Allard "to figure out how much of the profits [he] brought to Tri-Way. . . . There is no 
'negotiation' necessary." See.Gray Depo. Ex. 23. In a good faith effort to compensate plaintiff 
for his time with Tri-Way, and despite the fact that there was never a mutually agreed upon 
formula for calculation and payment of a bonus, in addition to his final salary, plaintiff was 
offered a bonus of $60,000, which was an attempt to "make a fair assessment of the value . . . for 
the two projects he ran" while with Tri-Way. See Peterson Depo., pp. 237-238. Plaintiff 
rejected this tendered payment as well. In the words of Rob Gray on October 26,2004, the 
parties tried "to put this 'deal' together over the [previous] few months," but "it just wasn't 
meant to be." Gray Depo. Ex. 23. 
11. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Defendants are entitfed to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
Upon review of an order of the district court granting summary judgment, the 
standard of review is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. 
Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500,504, 112 P.3d 788,792 (2005). Summary judgment is 
appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c). If there is no genuine issue 
of material fact, "only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." 
Watson, 141 Idaho at 504. 
In addition, a "nonmoving party's failure to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of ail element essential to that party's case, on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment." Jarman v. Hale, 122 
Idaho 952,955-56,842 P.2d 288,291-92 (Ct. App. 1992). The nonmoving party is further 
required to set forth specific facts, by affidavit of otherwise (and not mere conclusions), from 
admissible record evidence, in order to show a genuine issue of material fact. See Verbillis v. 
Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). 
B. The Undisputed Evidence of Record Establishes That the Parties Never 
Reached an Agreement with Respect to the Material Terms of the Alleged 
Contract. 
Plaintiff has argued that at the May 21, 2004 meeting, the parties "had an 
agreement as to the terms of his compensation," specifically that he "was to receive 50% net 
profits before taxes." Appellant's Brief 15-16. Mr. Gray described this "agreement" as follows: 
Q. Okay. I want to focus for a minute on the second page, your handwritten 
notes. Those appear to be some figures that you wrote down. And I understand 
that those are probably going to correspond to a later e-mail that we'll come to in 
a few minutes, but I want to get your recollection at this point on what led to the 
generation of these notes that are contained on Exhibit 14. 
A. What led to the generation of these notes was a conversation with Gary 
Peterson, a meeting between he, myself, and Ray Allard. 
Q. And do you recall what was discussed? 
A. It was not so much a discussion as Gary 'sproposal to revise the 
agreement as I knew it from May 2lst to something different. 
Q. You refer to May 21st there. Let me back up for just a minute to that date. 
Is May 21st the date upon which you believe the oral agreement had been reached 
establishing the terms of your employment agreement with Tri Way 
Construction? 
A. I believe a written agreement was in place at that time. 
Q. And when you say "a written agreement was in place," what do you mean 
by that? Had all of the parties- and by that I mean you, Gary, Ray, or anyone 
else from Tri-Way for that matter, signed a written agreement? 
A. The document had not been signed, but we were in agreement with respect 
to the terms of that agreement. 
See Gray Depo., p. 216, L. 7 - p. 217, L. 1 1 (emphasis added). 
The foregoing testimony clearly demonstrates Mr. Gray's acknowledged 
understanding that defendants intended to revise the terms of his proposed May 21 Draft 
Employment Agreement, which undermines his claimed belief that the very terms which were 
being revised somehow constituted "a written agreement." 
In Idaho, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove not only a contract's 
existence, but also its enforceability. Johnson v. Albert, 67 Idaho 44, 170 P.2d 403 (1946). The 
general rules for the formation of a contract were established long ago by this Court in Leavell & 
Co. v. Grafe &Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502,414 P.2d 873 (1966), where the Court wrote: 
In order to constitute a contract, there must be a distinct understanding common 
to both parties. The minds of the parties must meet as to all of its terms, and, if 
any portion of the proposed terms is unsettled and unprovided for, there is no 
contract. An offer to enter into a contractual relation must be so complete that 
upon acceptance an agreement is formed which contains all of the terms necessary 
to determine whether the contract has been performed or not. An acceptance of 
an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and unconditional, and 
must not modify or introduce any new terms into the offer. An acceptance 
which varies from the terms of the offer is a rejection of the offer and is a counter 
proposition, which must in turn be accepted by the offeror in order to constitute a 
binding contract. 
Leavell, 90 Idaho at 512 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396,582 
P.2d 1074 (1978) (holding that there must be a distinct understanding common to both parties in 
order for a contract to arise). 
To establish a meeting of the minds, admissible evidence must show that there 
was both a mutual understanding of the terms of the agreement, and that both parties "mutually 
assented to be bound by those terms." Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 Idaho 353, 796 P.2d 1026 
(Ct. App. 1990). This Court later provided a lengthy discussion of the mutuality requirement in 
Intermountain Forest Management Inc. v. Louisiana-Pac@c Corp., 136 Idaho 233,3 1 P.3d 921 
(2001). In that case, plaintiff IFM was represented by an employee named Briggs, who 
contacted defendant Louisiana-Pacific ("L-P"). about a possible logging contract. An employee 
of L-P, named Stone, provided IFM's Briggs with a copy of a written form contract used by L-P 
in such transactions. Although the plaintiff signed the agreement and L-P's Stone allegedly told 
the plaintiff to begin work, the contract was never approved or executed by anyone with 
authority at L-P. The court thus held that there was no enforceable contract, explaining: 
The record is clear that the contract was never executed by L-P. . . . It is 
uncontroverted that no representative of L-P ever executed the contract; therefore, 
even drawing all inferences in favor of IFM, there are no genuine issues of 
material fact in dispute regarding lack of execution of a formal contract and the 
district judge did not en- in granting L-P summary judgment on this issue. 
Intermountain Forest, 136 Idaho at 236. 
While plaintiff has argued in his opening brief that the Intermountain Forest 
decision is distinguishable because this case does not involve agency issues, the analysis of 
contract formation set forth therein is directly on point. Specifically, the Intermountain Forest 
court determined that the defendant's actions in giving M E  a copy of the written form contract 
was not an offer, but merely preliminary negotiations. In so concluding, the court held: 
The intent to have a written contract is shown by factors such as: (I) whether the 
contract. is one usually put in writing, (2) whether there are few or many details, 
(3) whether the amount involved is large or small, (4) whether it requires a formal 
writing for a full expression of the covenants and promises, and (5) whether the 
negotiafions indicate that a written draft is contemplated as thefinal conclusion 
of negotiations. The burden of proof is on the party asserting that the contract 
was binding before the written draft was signed. 
Id. at 237) (emphasis added). See also Mitchell, supra. The elements of formation as discussed 
by the inter mount air^ Forest court are not dependent on any agency analysis, and plaintiffs 
attempt to distinguish that case is unpersuasive. 
Having established the elements necessary for formation of an enforceable 
contract, the Intermountain Forest court determined further that, when the intent for a written 
agreement has been expressed, mutual assent requires a fully executed written contract: 
It is undisputed that theparties' intent was to create a written contract to govern 
their agreement and both parties were to execute the agreement. Briggs 
understood the document was unsigned when Stone presented it to him. Briggs 
also knew Stone did not have authority to bind L-P. Furthermore, Briggs was 
specifically told that the document had to be signed by Coates and would be 
returned to him by mail. The district judge was correct in inferring from the 
undisputed facts that the written contract was to be the consummation of the 
negotiations between the parties and that the signed contract would govern their 
relationship. Because L-P did not sign the document, and the district judge could 
reasonably infer L-P did not intend to be bound until the document was signed, 
the district judge did not e n  in concluding that the parties lacked mutual assent to 
be bound. 
Intermountain Forest, 136 Idaho at 237-38) (emphasis added). 
The Intermountain Forest case is particularly helpful here because it presents 
facts that are substantially similar to those presented in this case; e.g., L-P provided the proposed 
contract to IFM, and IFM began work, even though the contract had not been fully executed. 
Furthermore, the parties' intent was to memorialize their agreement with a written document, 
which was to be fully executed. These facts were undisputed in the Intermountain Forest case, 
and similar facts are undisputed in this case. Yet the Intermountain Forest court still found (as 
should this Court), that under Idaho law, no contract was formed because there was no mutual 
assent between the parties. 
Here, plaintiff presented defendants with a "Draft Employment Agreement" that 
had been prepared by his attorney and his accountant. The proposed terms were discussed at a 
May 21,2004, meeting in Vancouver, and though it is undisputed that plaintiffs draft was to be 
revised, he insists that an agreement had been reached, and he began work before the final 
agreement had been negotiated and reduced to a writing. See Gray Depo., pp. 216-217. There is 
no dispute that the parties intended to reduce their final agreement to a signed, "comprehensive" 
written agreement that would govern their working relationship. See Appellant's Brief 16. 
However, as in the Intermountain Forest case, the parties in this case never executed a 
completed agreement. 
Given Mr. Gray's acknowledgment that Mr. Peterson intended to revise the Draft 
Employment Agreement, the only reasonable inference which may be drawn is that Mr. Gray 
knew his version of the Drafi Employment Agreement had been rejected. The record evidence 
also contains a subsequent version of the Draft Employment Agreement, which reflected a 
number of changes, but this draft also bore an express, handwritten rejection by defendants, 
which hrther noted that the draft needed further changes. See Gray Depo., Exs. 6,8. Finally, 
plaintiff was provided with defendants' proposed revisions to Article IV of the Draft 
Employment Agreement, which outlined the proposed terms for plaintiffs compensation, 
includiug bonus calculation and payment terms. See Peterson Depo. Ex. 9. As has been noted 
elsewhere herein, however, this revision was rejected by plaintiff. 
Both the record evidence and plaintiff's own admissions at deposition lead to a 
single reasonable inference: that the parties were engaged in negotiation of employment terms 
that they intended to reduce to a final, comprehensive, written agreement. Despite plaintiffs 
claims to the contrary, the terms of that potential agreement were at all times being negotiated, 
and his claim that a final agreement on the material compensation terns had been reached on 
May 21 is unsupported by the record, and directly contrary to his o m  admission that the May 21 
Draft was being revised. As such, the Court may "reasonably infer," as did the district court, 
that defendants (in the words of the Intermountain Forest court) "did not intend to be bound until 
the document was signed, [and the district court may not be found to have] err[ed] in concluding 
that the parties lacked mutual assent to be bound." Intermountain Forest, 136 Idaho at 238. 
This Court has repeatedly recognized the "long existing contract principle" that: 
where it is clear that one party has agreed that an oral agreement must be reduced 
to writing before it shall be binding, there is no contract until a formal document 
is executed . . . therefore, the trial court was correct in holding that there was not a 
breach of contract when the parties did not intend to be bound until the execution 
of a formal contract. 
Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396,400,582 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978). 
In this case, it is undisputed that the parties not only never signed or otherwise 
accepted any of the draft agreements, but moreover, that the parties had each expressly rejected 
the others' proposed terms. Accordingly, the district court correctly held that no valid contract 
was formed, and entry of summary judgment was proper. 
1. All necessary inferences were drawn in plaintiffs favor. 
In a further attempt to defray this Court's attention from the fact that no valid 
contract was formed, plaintiff has argued on appeal that the district court "failed to construe the 
evidence in a light most favorable to [hiin]." Appellant's Brief 17. While there is no discussion 
with respect to the inferences which he claims should have been drawn in his favor, he appears to 
suggest that the evidence of whether a contract existed was capable of "more than one 
inference," and therefore the issue of formation could only be decided by a jury. This argument 
ignores a longstanding premise, recognized by the Idaho courts, that "an inference adverse to the 
nonmoving party may be drawn if it is the only reasonable inference." Verbillis v. Dependable 
Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Here, as defendants have shown above, between plaintiffs admission that on 
May 21,2004, he knew defendants intended to revise his proposed terms, and the subsequent 
exchange of drafts which clearly centered upon the compensation terms, there was but a single 
reasonable inference to be drawn: that the parties never reached a complete understanding 
concerning the terms of plaintiffs employment with Tri-Way, including the terms for calculation 
and payment of any bonus. As such, the district court did not "fail to construe the evidence in a 
light most favorable" to plaintiff, and the grant of summary judgment should be affirmed. 
2. Plaintiff3 conclusory allegations that defendants agreed to pay him a 
percentage of profits does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
Plaintiffs next argument centers upon his naked assertion that the "[elvidence 
indicates" that defendants "represented to Gray that he would receive 50% of the net profits from 
projects that he managed," and that defendants "acted in a manner that indicated that they agreed 
that Gray was to receive 50% of the net profits." Appellant's Brief 17. The only "evidence" 
submitted in this regard, however, is his self-serving affidavit submitted in support of his own 
motion for summary judgment, and excerpted portions of his own deposition testimony. R. at 
Exs. 2, 4. Again, the proffered "evidence" is not only self-serving, but directly contrary to other 
admissions by plaintiff and the weight of the record evidence described above. 
Plaintiff has also argued on appeal that it was not until "the terms of 
compensation [had been] set" that he "resigned from Albertsons in early May of 2004." 
Appellant's Brief 7. Assuming this representation to be true, and that Gray did not resign from 
his employment at Albertsons until after an agreement had allegedly been reached with respect 
to the terms of his compensation, the only inference which may reasonably be drawn is that this 
"agreement" had been reached by Rob Gray, and Rob Gray alone. It is undisputed that the first 
version of the Draft Employment Agreement was not submitted to defendants until May 19, 
2004, in preparation for the May 21 meeting in Vancouver. See Gray Depo. Ex. 6.  It is also 
undisputed, and the district court expressly noted, that Rob Gray resigned his employment with 
Albertson's, Inc. on May 1,2004. See R., p. 83 L. 17; Gray Depo., p. 84. 
Not only is the "evidence" on which plaintiff has relied on appeal contrary to his 
own testimony elsewhere in this case, but plaintiffs attempt to create an issue of fact by 
referencing his self-serving affidavit is insufficient under Idaho law. As the district court 
correctly noted, the "existence of disputed facts . . . will not defeat summary judgment when the 
non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to its case." R., p. 89, LL. 1-3, citing Garzee v. Barclay, 121 Idaho 771,774, 828 P.2d 
334,337 (Ct. App. 1992). Furthermore, the district court found that "disputes of material facts 
are not created by mere conclusory statement." R., p. 89, L. 4 (emphasis in original), citing 
Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778,786, 839 P.2d 1192, 1200 (1992). 
In fact, conclusory assertions, "in the face of the facts, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue 
of material fact." R., p. 89, LL. 10-1 1 (emphasis in original), citing Farm Credit Bank of 
Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,274,869 P.2d 1365,1369 (1994). 
Here, the conclusory statements set forth by plaintiff in his affidavit (R. at Ex. 4), 
and his equally conclusory testimony as referenced at pp. 6-10 of his statement of facts, are 
indeed "in the face of the facts," including not only the record evidence, but his own admissions 
made under oath. Because the admissibility of evidence contained in the affidavits and 
depositions in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold issue to 
be determined before applying the libera1 construction or reasonable inferences rule (Hecla 
Mining Go., 122 Idaho at 794), the district court did not err in finding that there was not a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not a valid contract had been formed. This holds 
true whether or not plaintiff is seeking to enforce the entirety of the May 21 Draft Employment 
Agreement, or the selected compensation provisions upon which he now relies. In the words of 
the district court, "Gray's 'conclusions' that he had an agreement or that he had the impression 
he had an agreement alone do not create a material dispute of fact, especially in the face of the 
overwhelming evidence the parties simply did not have an agreement, including Gray's own 
evidence." R., p. 89, LL. 20-23. 
C. The Statute of Frauds Was Correctly Applied by the District Court. 
To the extent that plaintiff has inferred that the district court improperly 
considered the statute of frauds analysis (see Appellant's Brief 3), even when the statute of 
frauds is not pled as an affirmative defense it may nonetheless he tried with the express or 
implied consent of the plaintiff. See Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 108,982 P.2d 940,943 
(1999). Here, at the summary judgment hearing the district court inquired whether or not the 
doctrine applied, and plaintiffs counsel not only did not object, but himself requested leave to 
submit additional briefing on the issue. R. at 66. Given that request, the district court correctly 
noted that where the defense was raised before trial and the party was given time to present 
argument in opposition, the defense of statute of frauds can be raised for the first time in the 
summary judgment proceedings. R. at 93, n.6, citing Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 
649 P.2d 1209 (1982). Accordingly, the issue of whether the statute of frauds applied was 
properly considered by the district court 
1. There was never an agreement with respect to compensation, whether 
it was to be paid within one year, or five years. 
Plaintiffs primary argument on appeal with respect to the statute of frauds is that 
it does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case, because "he is not seeking 
compensation from Tri-Way for employment going forward . . . [but] is only seeking to recover 
under the agreed upon bonus structure for the time that he worked at Tri-Way." Appellant's 
Brief 21. This argument improperly and inaccurately assumes that an enforceable agreement had 
been reached with respect to the alleged bonus structure. Furthermore, this claim is contrary to 
the record and the pleadings on file. According to the First Amended Complaint, the operative 
pleading on which summary judgment was granted, plaintiff is seeking, inter alia: "past and 
future loss of income," including income that he "would have received in merit and longevity 
wage increases" (R. at 35); "past and future suffering" (R. at 36); "past and future losses of 
income which Robert Gray would ordinarily have received" (R. at 36); "any future damages as 
may be proven" (R. at 36); as well as attorney fees based upon the contract claims he has 
continuously pursued (R. at 36.) Thus, the unenforceability of the entire Draft Employment 
Agreement is still squarely at issue in this case, and both the statute of frauds and controlling 
case law interpreting that statute preclude enforcement of any of the proposed terms. 
Whether the "agreement" was written or oral, and whether or not it could be 
performed in one year, plaintiff has failed to present admissible evidence that an agreement was 
ever actually formed. As with his earlier arguments, Mr. Gray relies exclusively upon his own 
affidavit and selected portions of his deposition testimony, insisting that certain terms had been 
settled. However, other portions of his testimony clearly indicate a shared intent among the 
parties to reduce the terms of Mr. Gray's employment to a "comprehensive written agreement." 
Moreover, there is ample evidence in the record that the parties never reached a final agreement 
with respect to the material terms of the employment relationship, most notably the terms 
governing compensation. Because Mr. Gray is relying solely upon self-serving, conclusory 
assertions that an agreement had been reached, which testimony is not premised upon-and is 
indeed directly contrary to-the overwhelming weight of the record evidence, there is but one 
inference which may reasonably be drawn: that no agreement was ever reached with respect to 
the proposed bonus structure. In the absence of an agreement, the issue of whether any such 
alleged agreement was subject to the statute of frauds is moot. 
2. The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not operate as an exclusion to 
the statute of frauds in this case. 
Mr. Gray further argues that, even if the statute of frauds were found to apply to 
his alleged agreement, because he was allowed to begin working for Tri-Way, there has been 
sufficient "part performance" to invoke an exception to the statute. Appellant's Brief 23. It 
should be noted that the on& exception to the statute of frauds being argued by plaintiff on 
appeal is the doctrine of part performance. As such, any additional claimed exceptions have 
been waived. See Rowley v. Fuhmman, I33 Idaho 105, 108,983 P.2d 940,943 (1999) ("fjailure 
to . . . address [an] issue in the opening brief eliminates consideration of it on appeal"). 
Regarding the part performance exception to the statute of frauds, the Court of 
Appeals of Idaho stated: 
We acknowledge that in some circumstances an oral agreement may be removed 
from the strictures of the statute of frauds by part or full performance. This 
exception to the statute of frauds is grounded in equity. The exception protects a 
party who demonstrates reliance upon an oral contract by acts that would not have 
been done but for the contract. . . . 
Wolske Bros., Inc. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co., 116 Idaho 714,715-16,779 P.2d 28,29-30 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Despite this recognized exception, it is not universally applied and, indeed, the 
exception based on part performance has no application here. Following Wolske, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals adopted the following premise: 
First, it has long been established in Idaho law that the doctrine ofpart 
performance is not applicable to a contract which comes within the statute of 
frauds because it cannot beperformed within one year. Allen, 84 Idaho at 23, 
367 P.2d at 582. "The mere part performance of such a contract does not take it 
out of the operation of the statute or permit a recovery under the contract for any 
part of the contract remaining executory. . . . [T]o hold that part performance is 
performance would be a nullification of the statute." Id. 
Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485,489,20 P.3d 21 
(Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added). 
It is also well-settled under Idaho law that the doctrine of part performance "is 
best understood as a specific form of the more general principle of equitable estoppel." 
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat '1 Ass 52, 141 Idaho 362,368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1 110 (2005). 
Accordingly, the district court properly recognized that plaintiff's claimed part performance 
exception to the statute of frauds depends upon whether the part performance was such as to 
equitably estop defendants from relying upon the statute as a defense, and ultimately found that it 
did not. R., p. 94, L. 26 - p. 95, L. 2. 
The elements of equitable estoppel are: 
1) there must be a falscrepresentation or concealment of a 
material fact made with actual or constructive knowledne of the - 
truth; 
2) the party asserting estoppel did not and could not have 
discovered the truth; 
3) there was intent that the misrepresentation be relied upon; 
and 
4) the party asserting estoppel relied upon the 
misrepresentation or concealment to his or her prejudice. 
Sorensen v. Saint Al 's, 141 Idaho 754, 759, 1 18 P.3d 86,91 (2005). 
Additional considerations also apply when part performance/equitable estoppel is 
raised within the context of the statute of frauds. For instance, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
held on multiple occasions that "the reliance by the party claiming estoppel must be referable 
only to the contractual term that is in dispute." Treasure Valley, 135 Idaho at 491. In other 
words, "the performance must evidence the promise." Fmntz v. Parke, 11 1 Idaho 1005, 1010, 
729 P.2d 1069,1073 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Despite plaintiffs argument to the contrary, the facts of this case are substantially 
similar to those presented in the Treasure Valley case. First, Mr. Gray argues that he began his 
employment because, in his mind, he and Tri-Way had reached an agreement. Treasure Valley 
Gastroenterology had taken the same position in seeking to enforce terms which it felt had been 
agreed upon as well. Further, while Mr. Gray began work on June 1, he knew at that time that 
the final terms of his employment agreement were still under negotiation, and had not been 
finalized. The defendant in the Treasure Valley case had a similar understanding; namely, that 
she had been allowed to "begin work without agreement on all the terms of the employment in 
the expectation that the details of the contract would be worked out later." Treasure Valley, 135 
Idaho at 491. There, the court held that "Treasure Valley's acts of reliance do not provide 
evidence of the contractual term asserted by Treasure Valley which, when combined with the 
other elements of equitable estoppel, could serve as a substitute for the writing that is otherwise 
required by the statute of frauds." Id. As a result, the court of appeals upheld the district court's 
grant of summary judgment. 
The same result should apply here. Simply put, plaintiffs performance may have 
been referable to a portion of the terms contained in the Draft contracts, but the parties' 
continuing negotiations demonstrate that other material terms-including the disputed term upon 
which plaintiff relies in this case, i.e., compensation-were not final. Thus, while it may be said 
that an employment relationship existed between Mr. Gray and Tri-Way, the material terms of 
that relationship were never settled. This Court has clearly held that before an alleged oral 
agreement will be enforced by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the alleged agreement "must be 
complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable 
themselves of being reduced to certainty." Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367 (emphasis added). 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that there were yet material terms 
under negotiation which were not "compiete, definite and certain." As such, neither paxt 
performance nor equitable estoppel may be used as an exception to the statute of frauds and its 
requirement that the Draft Employment Agreement be reduced to a final, executed writing. 
D. Absent Evidence of an Agreement Establishing the Method of Calctrtation 
and/or Means of Payment of the Alleged Bonus, There Is No Basis for the 
Statutory Wage Claim. 
In his appellate brief, Mr. Gray argues that he introduced "evidence that the 
parties agreed to the terms of his bonus compensation." Appellant's Brief 24. The only 
argument presented in this respect, however, is a reference back to his earlier argument that the 
district court failed to construe certain facts in his favor; namely, the "facts" set forth in his 
affidavit (R. at Ex. 4), and selected deposition testimony. As shown above, the "facts" upon 
which plaintiff relied were conclusory, contrary to the record evidence and otherwise 
inadmissible, and there was simply no competent evidence demonstrating that the parties had 
ever agreed to the terms of any bonus for plaintiff. Defendants, on the other hand, presented 
evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment establishing that even though the 
terms for calculation and payment of the bonus were never settled, plaintiff was nonetheless 
offered a substantial bonus amounting to three times the salary he had earned in the course of his 
employment with Tri-Way. 
Idaho's wage and hour law defines a "wage claim" as an employee's claim 
against his or her employer for compensation owed to the employee for "personal services" and 
includes in that definition any "wages, penalties, or damages provided by law to employees with 
a claim for unpaid wages." IDAHO CODE § 45-601(6) (2006). The term "wages" is also defined 
to include "compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is 
determined on a time, task, piece or commission basis." IDAHO CODE 9 45-601(7). The 
definition of "wage" has been held to include any "ascertainable unpaid commissions and 
bargained-for compensation." Moove v. Omnicave, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 819, 118 P.3d 141 
(2005) (emphasis added). 
This Court has previously concluded that a "claim for an employee bonus, which 
was calculated by reference to the net profit of the defendant company and paid yearly, was part 
of the compensation bargained for in the agreement of employment." Johnson v. Allzed Stoves 
Covp., 106 Idaho 363,367,679 P.2d 640 (1984). As set forth in extensive detail above, 
however, the primary point of contention in the parties' negotiation of an employment agreement 
in this case was the method of calculation and means of payment of such a bonus. Accordingly, 
there was never a "bargained for" agreement on the bonus to be paid in this matter. Plaintiff 
instead resigned his employment with defendants before any agreement could be reached. See 
Gray Depo. Ex.  22A. Nevertheless, defendants still tendered a bonus to plaintiff in recognition 
of his contribution to the company, offering him $60,000 upon his resignation in November 
2004. See Peterson Depo., pp. 237-238. Plaintiff simply rejected that payment. 
Plaintiff argues that defendants violated the Wage Claim Act because he was not 
provided with a bonus according to the terms that he had been negotiatiteg. The Johnson case 
cited above, however, refers to compensation that was "bargained for" in the parties' 
employment agreement. Because no bargain was reached here, it is impossible to argue that 
plaintiff is entitled to a bonus to be paid in accordai~ce with the disputed terms. The fact 
remains, and is undisputed, that plaintiff was offered a bonus payment. Furthermore, that bonus 
payment was significantly larger than any bonus previously offered by Tri-Way, either to its 
employees or its owners. For example, defendant Gary Peterson testified that when bonuses had 
been offered in the past, they were in an amount equal to two weeks' pay, "across the board." 
See Peterson Depo., pp. 52, 56. The bonus offered plaintiff, however, was in an amount three 
times greater than the salary he had earned in his five months of employment with Tri-Way. Yet 
plaintiff refused this amount, and instead continued to insist on not only fifty percent of Tri- 
Way's gross profits, but also an additional twenty-five percent ofthose profits in a retained 
earnings account which would go toward his planned buyout of Gary Peterson, despite the 
operative fact that no bonus had been fully and finally "bargained for." See Gray Depo., 
pp. 222-223,235; Gray Depo., Exs. 14, 15. 
Plaintiff has failed, both below and on appeal, to establish any evidence that an 
agreement had been reached concerning payment of any bonus. For the reasons described in the 
preceding sections, as well as those herein, the district court properly determined that there was 
no violation of the wage claim statute, and the grant of summary judgment should be affirmed. 
E. Plaintiff Has Not Established the Elements Necessary To Support a Claim for 
Quantum Meruit. 
In attempting to resuscitate his quantum meruit claim, plaintiff argues that "absent 
an agreement fixing compensation, any evidence tending to show the reasonable value of 
services is generally admissible." Appellant's Brief 26. He then argues that "evidence of the 
value of Gray's services can be found with reference to the benefit achieved by Tri-Way." Id. 
The doctrine of quantum meruit is, as the district court found, a remedy for an 
implied in fact contract, and it permits a party to recover the reasonable value of services 
rendered or materials provided, on the basis of an implied promise to pay. Cheung v. Pena, 143 
Idaho 30, 35, 137 P.3d 417,422 (2006). An implied in fact contract is further defined as "one 
where the terms and existence of the contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with 
the request of one party and the performance by the other ofien being inferred from the 
circumstances attending the performance." Fox v. Mountain J% Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 
52 P.3d 848, 853 (2002). When seeking to establish a claim for quantum meruit, the burden is 
on the party claiming its applicability. Evickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430,435,64 P.3d 959,964 
(Ct. App. 2002). In addition, the measure of damages must be proven by evidence 
demonstrating the nature of the work, and the customary rate of pay for such work in the 
community at the time the work was performed. See Baker v Borerr, 129 Idaho 885,894,934 
P.2d 951,960 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Here, the district court found it significant that "Gray does not dispute that he was 
compensated for his services at the agreed upon salary." R., p. 114, LL. 21-22. Indeed, plaintiff 
has not argued on appeal that the $4,000 salary which he proposed in his initial Draft 
Employment Agreement was unacceptable, nor has he argued that such salary was never paid. 
Instead, plaintiff argues solely that he was entitled to a bonus, which was to be calculated at the 
rate he set forth in his May 21 Draft Employment Agreement, despite the overwhelming 
evidence that this term was one of the key barriers to reaching a final agreement. The lack of an 
agreement notwithstanding, plaintiff has never offered any evidence establishing that a bonus is 
part of the "customary rate of pay" for the work he performed while with Tri-Way, nor is there 
any evidence demonstrating the prevailing rate for such a bonus "in the community at the time 
the work was performed," elements which this Court has deemed necessary in establishing a 
claim for quantum meruit. See Bake?; 129 Idaho at 894. Given this failure to establish the 
necessary elements of his claim, upon which plaintiff bears the burden of proof, entry of 
summary judgment was not only appropriate, but mandatory. 
Perhaps recognizing this fatal defect in his quantum meruit claim, plaintiff has 
attempted on appeal to create an issue of material fact by concluding that "Tri-Way testified that 
it always intended to share profits with Gary." Appellant's Brief 26. Even if all inferences 
raised by this claim were drawn in plaintifPs favor, the mere allegation itself does not establish 
the formula for calculation of such a bonus. Yet as evidence that defendants followed through 
on the alleged intent to offer plaintiff a bonus, the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff was 
offered the sum of $60,000 following his resignation, a sum representing approximately 300% of 
the salary he had earned in his five months of employment with Tri-Way. Gary Peterson 
explained that the purpose of this payment was to "make a fair assessment of the value . . . for 
the two projects he ran" while with Tri-Way. See Peterson Depo., pp. 237-238. Accordingly, 
even though plaintiff has failed to establish the elements to support his quantum meruit claim, 
the record evidence shows that defendants endeavored to provide plaintiff with a reasonable 
value for his services, in addition to the salary he had agreed to accept. The fact that Mr. Gray 
unilaterally felt that $60,000 was insufficient is not evidence that a larger sum was "customary 
for such work in the community" in November 2004, and it certainly is not evidence that he was 
entitled to 50% of the company's profits. In short, based upon the lack of evidence submitted by 
plaintiff, the district court had no alternative but to dismiss the quantum meruit claim. 
P. Plaintiff Never Presented Sufficient Evidence Establishing a Claim for Unjust 
Enrichment. 
Having failed to establish the necessary elements for quantum meruit, plaintiff 
argues alternatively that defendants were unjustly enriched by his services while with Tri-Way. 
Appellant's Brief 27. In so doing, he insists that the district court erred when it determined that 
"Gray introduced no evidence of the amount Tn-Way was enriched by bringing in two projects." 
Id., citing R. at 117. In so arguing, plaintiff misreads both the district court's order and the 
applicable case law. 
Recovery under an unjust enrichment theory is limited to the amount by which the 
defendant was unjustly enriched. See Erickson v. FZynn, 138 Idaho at 434. It is not enough to 
simply show that the defendants were "enriched" as a result of plaintiffs services, since to do so 
would entitle every employee who performs his or her job with even a modicum of competence 
to pursue an unjust enrichment claim. The key, as noted by the district court and Idaho's 
appellate courts, is that the defendants must have "received a benefit from the plaintiff which it 
would be inequitable to retain without compensating plaintiff for the value of the benefit." R. 
at 1 15 (emphasis added), citing Cont ? Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chandler, 95 Idaho 739, 743,5 18 
P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974). 
Contrary to the position urged by plaintiff on appeal, the measure of recovery for 
unjust enrichment is "&the actual amount of the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment 
which, as between the two parties it would be unjust for oneparty to retain." R. at 1 16 
(emphasis in original), citing Hixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327,281 P.2d 1042 (1955). Evidence of 
enrichment alone is not enough; there must be evidence that the amount of any alleged 
enrichment was "unjust." As with a claim for quantum meruit, the party seeking recovery under 
an unjust enrichment theory bears the burden to "present evidence not only of the value of the 
services it rendered, but also 'the amount of the benefit which, if retained by the defendant, 
would result in their unjust enrichment."' R. at 116, citing Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 
1017, 829 P.2d 1361,1366 (Ct. App, 1991). 
Ilere, the only "evidence" submitted by plaintiff concerning unjust enrichment, 
whether at the district court level or on appeal, is his claim that Gray brought two projects to Tri- 
Way withgross revenues of approximately $1,175,000. Appellant's Brief 27. However, the 
record evidence also demonstrates that the net income on the projects plaintiff brought to Tri- 
Way were significantly less. Specifically, Kathy Peterson established at her deposition that the 
net income for the Phoenix division was $271,792.48. See Deposition Transcript of Kathy 
Peterson, Ex. 2, attached as Ex. F to the Affidavit of Scott E. Randolph in Support of Plaintiffs 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at Ex. 8.) That same portion of 
Mrs. Peterson's deposition also established costs, expenses, and other overhead associated with 
the Phoenix division in the amount of $694,281.52. See id. 
In spite of the disparity between the "revenues" described by plaintiff and the 
record evidence showing significantly lower numbers, it is the gross revenue to which plaintiff 
points when arguing that Tri-Way was "enriched" in an amount that "far outweighed the $4,000 
per month salary he was paid." Appellant's Brief 27. Idaho law does not require evidence of 
enrichment alone, but instead requires the plaintiff to come forth with evidence establishing the 
amount of the alleged "enrichment" that it would be inequitable for defendants to retain. The 
only "evidence" proffered by Mr. Gray in this case has been a misplaced reliance upon gross 
revenues. The record evidence demonstrates, on the other hand, that defendants offered to pay 
plaintiff the sum of $60,000 in acknowledgment of "the value . . . for the two projects he ran" 
while with Tri-Way. See Peterson Depo., pp. 237-238. The $60,000 tendered by Tri-Way 
amounted to approximately 25% of the net income generated by the Phoenix division. 
Nevertheless, it is not incumbent upon defendants to establish that $60,000 was a reasonable 
tender. Instead, under Idaho law, it is plaintiffs burden to come forward with admissible 
evidence that defendants were unjustly enriched by "only" offering him $60,000 in addition to 
his salary. Having failed to come forward with any evidence beyond his own conclusory 
statements that he should have been paid more, plaintiff has indeed failed to meet his burden of 
proof, and the district court properly granted summary judgment. 
G. Gray Did Not Justifiably Rely Upon Any Alleged Statements Regarding Profit 
Sharing. 
Although plaintiff argues that his fraud claims were based on "affirmative 
misstatements of facts as well as fraudulent concealment with the intent to induce Gray to begin 
his employment with Tri-Way," the district court correctly found that he had failed to establish 
each of the elements necessary to sustain a claim for fraud. The basis for this argument is 
plaintiffs insistence that he never acknowledged that the terms of his Draft Employment 
Agreement were never agrecd upon by the parties. See Appellant's Brief 29. In fact, he 
maintains that "he reached an agreement on the material terms of both the employment 
agreement and the option to purchase the Petersons' interest in Tn-Way at the May 21,2004 
meeting." Id. (emphasis added). 
Before turning to the substantive fraud analysis, it is worth noting that the position 
taken by plaintiff at page 29 of his brief is directly contrary to his deposition testimony, wherein 
he expressly acknowledged that while discussing the May 21 Draft Employment Agreement with 
Gary Peterson, Mr. Gray knew that the terms he had proposed were being revised by defendants. 
See Gray Depo., p. 216, LL. 19-21. Given this testimony, plaintiff's argument on appeal that "he 
[had] reached an agreement on the material terms" very plainly indicates that any such 
"agreement" was unilaterally held by Mr. Gray. The conduct of Mr. Peterson, as acknowledged 
by plaintiff in the above-cited testimony, clearly manifested a disagreement over the tellns 
contained in both agreements. Furthermore, Mr. Gray's recognition that the terms of the two 
alleged agreements were being revised bears directly upon his fraud claims, as such an 
acknowledgment undermines plaintiffs claim that false statements were made, his ignorance of 
the allegedly false statements, his reliance on the truth of defendants' alleged statements, and 
certainly his right to rely on the allegedly false statements. 
I. Plaintiff has not proven each of the elements of fraud by clear and 
convincing evidence. 




the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its 
truth; 
his intent that it should be acted on by the person and in the 
manner reasonably contemplated; 
the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; 
his reliance on the truth; 
his right to rely thereon; and 
his consequent and proximate injury. 
Galaxy Outdoor Adver. v. Idaho Transp. Dep 't, 109 Idaho 692,696,710 P.2d 602,606 (1985). 
The party alleging the fraud has the burden of proving each element by clear and convinciag 
evidence. Id. 
Speaking to a party's right to rely upon the truth of the alleged representation, this 
Court previously noted that a plaintiff must show that his or her alleged reliance upon the truth of 
the purported misrepresentation was justified. See Stewart Title of Idaho, Inc. v. Nampa Land 
Title, Inc., 110 Idaho 330,715 P.2d 1000 (1986). In the Stewart case, an escrow agent had sued 
for damages arising from an alleged misrepresentation by a title company's agent that title 
defects in a land transaction had been cured, and that the transaction could he closed. The court 
described the element of justifiable reliance as: 
An essential element of the torts of both fraud and negligent misrepresentation is 
that the recipient's reliance on the misrepresentation be justified. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) TORTS $5 537,552 (1977). In the instant case, the trial court 
concluded, as a matter of law, that Anderson's reliance on Astleford's alleged 
misrepresentatio~ls was not justified. The court determined that a reasonable and 
prudent closing officer in the Boise area would not have relied upon such 
representations, but would have investigated further and taken further action to 
ensure that the exceptions were, in fact, cleared prior to closing. Appellant argues 
that the trial court's conclusions are not supported by the evidence. 
Stewart, 110 Idaho at 332. 
A statement of mere opinion, or a statement as to a future event cannot provide a 
basis for establishing fraud, even if such a statement, had it related to a past or existing fact when 
made, would have provided such a claim. See Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837,843,820 
P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991). There, the plaintiff had sued for fraud, contending the defendant 
represented to him that if he committed to an Ore-Ida contract, all of his potatoes would be 
purchased and paid for under that contract. When those potatoes were not purchased as initially 
discussed, the court concluded the defendant's statement that he would need all of the plaintiffs 
potatoes to fulfill the Ore-Ida contact was not a statement of past or existing fact, but rather was 
an opinion only, upon which the plaintiff had no right to rely: 
[A] representation consisting of [sic] promise or a statement as to a future event 
will not serve as a basis for fraud, even though it was made under circumstances 
as to knowledge and belief which would give rise to an action for fraud had it 
related to an existing or past fact. The law requires the plaintiff to have formed 
his or her own conclusions as to such fkture events, and will not justify or remedy 
the plaintiffs reliance and change of position based on another's prediction or 
opinion. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Here, the discussion between the parties concerning both the bonus structure and 
the proposed buyout were, at that time, merely "prediction or opinion." Because these terms 
were subject to lengthy, and at times contentious negotiations, the alleged statements that 
plaintiff would receive profits and that he would be allowed to purchase a share of the company 
at a set price cannot possibly have been statements of past or existing facts. Plaintiff knew that 
his Draft Employment Agreement was an initial proposal, that it was subject to ongoing 
discussions, and that no final agreement as to its contents had been reached, botli before and after 
he began his employment with Tri-Way. There is no dispute that the parties were negotiating the 
payment of "certain profits" and his proposed purchase of "ownership in Tri-Way at a set price." 
The "misrepresentations" alleged by plaintiff in his First Amended Complaint are simply a 
reiteration of the terms he was trying to negotiate in his Draft Employment Agreement, and he 
also has acknowledged that those terms were never "agreed upon by the parties." See Gray 
Depo., pp. 86-87,91, 106, 123, 158, 181, 195, 197,200,203,206-207,240, and 244. As such, 
they cannot be said to have constituted "past or existing facts." 
Furthermore, while plaintiff claims that defendants never intended to reach an 
agreement (see R. at 29), defendants Gary Peterson and Ray Allard have both testified that they 
believed a bonus system would be negotiated, that it would include a percentage of company 
profits, and that such was their intent from the beginning. See Peterson Depo., pp. 15 1, 152, and 
266; Allard Depo., p. 152. Accordingly, the statements that plaintiff alleges were knowingly 
false at the time they were made were never false. As in the Mitchell case, if, at the time the 
alleged promise was made the defendants intended to pay plaintiff a bonus to be negotiated, and 
offer him a negotiated price for buying into the company, "the fact that [they] subsequently 
broke that promise does not create a cause of action for fraud." Mitchell, 120 Idaho at 843. 
Finally, in light of the fact that plaintiffknew that the allegedly false statements 
were, in fact, the subject of ongoing negotiations, he was not justified in relying upon the alleged 
representations. The district court addressed this very issue, and based its decision upon the 
record evidence which established that "Gray clearly knew that the agreement terms were still 
being negotiated when he began working for Tri-Way." R. at 118. Thus, the court correctly 
determined that it was "not required to simply accept Gray's conclusory opinions that he had an 
agreement," particularly "when the facts so clearly indicate that when he began working for Tri- 
Way he himself continued to send and receive draft agreements with italicized words in the v e y  
sections addressing the bonus issue indicating the provisions needed revisions." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Plaintiff also argues that the district court erred in holding that there was not a 
sufficient showing of justifiable reliance because he "reasonably relied" on the alleged 
representation that he would receive "50% of net profits." Appellant's Brief 30. However, in 
support of this contention, he refers back to his earlier claim that he had "introduced facts that 
support a claim for equitable estoppel on the basis that the Tri-Way Parties falsely represented or 
concealed material facts" from him. Id. The only "fact" to which he points with any specificity 
is "that the Tri-Way Parties never told Gray that they had rejected the terms of his employment 
agreement." Id. Given the testimony which has been presented earlier, wherein Mr. Gray 
admitted that Gary Peterson had told him he was going to be revising the agreement presented by 
plaintiff on May 21,2004 (see Gray Depo., p. 216, LL. 19-21), this argument is wholly without 
merit. Plaintiff cannot reasonably claim that he was justified in relying upon any alleged 
"agreement" when, at the same time, he admits that on May 21 he knew that the terms of that 
same purported agreement were being revised by defendants. For similar reasons, plaintiffs 
alleged reliance on the "fact that the Tri-Way Parties allowed Gray to begin working and only 
later attempted to renegotiate the terms of Gray's agreement" is so contrary to knowledge he 
admittedly held on May 21, that it cannot serve as a basis for fraud. 
2. Any reliance by plaintiff on the alleged representations from 
defendants was unreasonable, precluding application of promissory 
estoppel. 
Should plaintiff argue later on appeal that he reasonably relied upon the alleged 
representations of defendants in a manner that caused him economic detriment and that the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel should be applied, as he indeed argued to the district court, this 
argument also fails as a matter of law. 
The elements of promissory estoppel are as follows: 
(1) reliance upon a specific promise; 
(2) substantial economic loss to the promisee as a result of 
such reliance; 
(3) the loss to the promisee was or should have been 
foreseeable by the promisor; and 
(4) the promisee's reliance on the promise must have been 
reasonable. 
Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397,399,49 P.3d 402,404 (2002). 
This Court has repeatedly concluded that "[p]romissory estoppel is simply a 
substitute for consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between parties." Lettunich v. Key 
Bunk Nut? Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362,368, 109 P.3d 1104, 11 10 (2005). In Lettunich, the plaintiff 
had argued that promissory estoppel should be applied to prevent his lender from denying the 
enforceability of an oral promise. See Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367. The court, on the other hand, 
found that "there was no complete promise . . . to be enforced." Id. Accordingly, the court held 
that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was "of no consequence in this case because there is 
evidence of adequate consideration. What is lacking is a sufficiently definite agreement." 
Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 368 (emphasis added). 
The same result should apply here. This is not a matter of inadequate 
consideration to support an alleged oral promise. Instead, the central issue in this case is whether 
any binding promise was ever made in the first place. Because the alleged promise was in reality 
a term that had been proposed by plaintiff, but which was also subject to ongoing negotiations, 
no "sufficiently definite agreement" was made and promissory estoppel should not be applied. 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, plaintiff has not offered any admissible 
evidence to support his claim for fraud. Instead, he has repeatedly referred to two self-serving 
and glaringly incorrect claims that either: 1) he had not been told that his proposed terms had 
been rejected; or 2) that defendants allowed him to come to work and later attempted to 
renegotiate the "terms" of his employment. Mr. Gray's deposition testimony has shown that 
both of these assertions are false. According to his deposition testimony, he knew on May 21 
that his proposed terms were being revised, and that those revisions were still pending when he 
began working for Tri-Way on June 1,2004. These elements argued on appeal are the same as 
those argued to the district court. Because the record is replete with testimony from plaintiff 
which directly contradicts the claims he argued before the district court, and which he continues 
to argue on appeal, the district court cannot be said to have erred when it granted summary 
judgment on the fraud claim. 
H. There Is No Evidence of Any Relationship of Trust or Confidence Which 
Would Support a Claim for Constructive Fraud. 
While plaintiff has stated that the district court did not expressly address his claim 
for constructive fraud, he has argued that a relationship of trust and confidence existed in this 
case which rendered entry of summary judgment improper. However, as will be shown below, 
there was no such relationship, in that a friendship between Rob Gray and Ray Allard is in itself 
insufficient, and the "arrangement at issue [for] profit sharing," even if such was sufficient to 
create a fiduciary relationship, is premised upon an agreement that never formed, and which 
therefore cannot serve as the basis for a constructive fraud claim. 
Constructive fraud "comprises all acts, omissions and concealments involving a 
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence and resulting in damage to another." 
Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho at 844. Furthermore, constructive fraud "usually arises from a 
breach of duty where a relation of trust and confidence exists." Id. Though plaintiff has argued 
that a "relationship of trust and confidence" existed between the parties, he does not state any 
reasons for that conclusion. 
The plaintiff in Mitchell had argued that such a relationship should be based upon 
the fact that the parties were also parties to a contract and were thus obliged to act in good faith, 
and that there the plaintiff had trusted the defendant. See id. at 844. The court clearly stated that 
"neither of these facts [was] sufficient to establish a relationship of trust and confidence from 
which the law will imposefiduciary obligations." Id. (emphasis added). The court even went so 
far as to offer examples of relationships from which such a relationship would be imposed, none 
of which have been demonstrated in this case: 
Examples of relationships from which the law will impose fiduciary obligations 
on the parties include when the parties are: members of the same family, partners, 
attorney and client, executor and beneficiary of an estate, principal and agent, 
insurer and insured, or close friends. All the evidence presented in this case 
shows that Mitchell and Barendregt shared none of these relationships, hut were 
parties who entered into an agreement at arms length. 
Even though plaintiff claims that he was trying to become a partner with 
defendants, at the time the negotiations for his employment were taking place he was an 
employee, not a partner, and did not share the type of relationship that would impose a 
heightened duty. Furthermore, Mr. Gray provided lengthy testimony during his deposition 
describing the nature of his acquaintance with Ray Allard, which demonstrates nothing more 
than a casual business acquaintance. See Gray Depo., p. 62, L. 10 - p. 64, L. 13. There has been 
no evidence establishing a relationship of trust and confidence between Mr. Gray and 
Mr. Peterson (or with Mrs. Peterson or Ray Allard, for that matter), as that term has been defined 
by this Court, and plaintiffs claim for constructive fraud was properly dismissed by Judge 
Copsey. 
IV. PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS APPEAL OF THE AWARD OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
This Court has very plainly stated that a party's "failure to include [an] issue in 
their statement of issues or address the issue in their opening brief eliminates consideration of it 
on appeal." Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105,108,982 P.2d 940,943 (1999). Argument in a 
subsequent reply brief is insufficient to cure this defect. See State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 
758,763,864 P.2d 596,601 (1993). Appellant's Brief sets forth seven (7) issues presented on 
appeal, none of which mention in any fashion the issue of costs and attorney fees awarded to 
defendants on December 21,2007. Accordingly, plaintiff has waived his opportunity to pursue 
the appeal on costs and attorney fees, and the issue may not be considered hrther. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondents request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Rules 35 and 41 Idaho 
Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code Section 12-121. Under Idaho law, attorney fees may be 
awarded on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 if the "Court is lefi with the abiding 
belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
foundation." See Rowley, 135 Idaho at 110. Moreover, it has been held that attorney fees "are 
awardable if an appeal does no more than simply invite an appellate court to second-guess the 
trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is well settled and appellant has made no 
substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law." Johnson v. Edwards, 113 Idaho 
660,662, 747 P.2d 69 (1987). In other words, when a "dispassionate view of the record 
discloses that there is no valid reason to anticipate reversal of the judgment below," attorney fees 
should be awarded. Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 81,644 P.2d 1333 (1982). 
In this case, plaintiff has simply asked this Court to reevaluate the evidence or 
second-guess the district court's well-reasoned decision granting defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. No substantial legal argument has been presented, and defendants should be 
awarded attorney fees on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request this Court to affirm 
the district court's entry of summary judgment on all counts of the Amended Complaint, and 
award defendants their attorney fees on appeal. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I I-IEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of July, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Erik F. Stidham ( 4 s .  Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HOLLAND & HART LLP ( ) Hand Delivered 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1400 ( ) Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2527 ( ) Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Facsimile (208) 343-8869 

